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REFLECTIONS ON LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS FOR DELAY
DR VERNON NASE*

ABSTRACT
This paper provides an analysis of both international and Australian law on the
liability of air carriers and compensation for delay. It discusses the need for States to
develop standard regulatory responses to delay in international carriage. It uses the
EC Regulation and the New Zealand legislation as models for developing clearer legal
principles and ensuring appropriate compensation for passengers affected by delay. It
concludes that domestic regulation and guidance regarding delay and overbooking of
flights is required to ensure appropriate liability of air carriers and clarity for
passengers.

I INTRODUCTION
“Oh Mona, is this really the end
To be stuck in Beijing
With the Guangzhou blues again.”
(With apologies to Bob Dylan)
As a general observation, travellers frequently misunderstand their rights and
entitlements while travelling on seeming domestic flights as part of their overseas
travel. Some would be surprised to learn that such legs are invariably conceptualised
by the law as being part of international carriage and subject to the applicable
international Convention, either a version of the Warsaw Convention system 1 or the
Montreal Convention of 1999.2 As long as the flight at the time of booking was

* Visiting Fellow, City University of Hong Kong.
1 The Warsaw Convention (The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air), opened for signature 12 October 1929, (entered into force 13
February 1933).
2 The Montreal Convention (The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air), opened for signature 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309 (entered into force 4 November
2003).
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conceptualised as a leg of one undivided international carriage by air, it does not
matter that a particular leg occurred within the borders of a particular country.3

II CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE
The author of this article recently found himself subject to a delay for a flight from
Beijing to Guangzhou in southern China. While for most Chinese nationals on the
flight this was domestic carriage governed by China’s internal aviation laws, for the
author, and other passengers en route to Perth in Western Australia, this is correctly
classed as international carriage governed by the Montreal Convention on air carriers’
liability.4
Delays on international flights in China are notoriously common. 5 The general
problem in China is that the use of air space is dominated by the military with only
relatively narrow corridors, representing around 20% of Chinese airspace, available to
passenger carrying commercial aircraft.6 The delay in the Beijing to Guangzhou flight
encountered by the author resulted initially from mechanical problems in the aircraft,
which led to complete cancellation of the flight and reallocation of passengers to later
flights. In this case there was a three-hour delay spent standing in a line for transfer
passengers in which foreign passengers were attended to last. The author was
allocated to a later flight that left Beijing after the connecting flight had departed
Guangzhou for Perth. The overall delay in departure was five and a half hours.
The author was engaged in international carriage by air. The governing law is found in
Articles 1 and 18 of the Montreal Convention. Article 1 outlines the characteristics of
international carriage of passengers by air. It places emphasis on the places of
3 Article 1(2) of the Montreal Convention defines ‘international air carriage’ as being "any carriage in
which … the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there is a break in the
carriage, are situated either within the territories of 2 High Contracting Parties, or within the territory
of a single High Contracting Party if there is a stopping place in another country (whether or not that
country is a signatory to the convention)". Further, Article 1(3) provides that "[a] carriage ... is
deemed ... to be one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation."
4 China is a State Party to the Montreal Convention, effective from 31/07/05. Australia is also a State
Party to the Convention, effective from 24/01/09.
5 Vernon Nase and Nicholas Humphrey, ‘Angry People in the Sky: Air Rage and the Tokyo
Convention’ (2014) 79 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 701, 710; Jeff Stone, Airline Passengers
Revolt After Three-Day Delay in China (16 July 2012) International Business Times
<http://www.ibtimes.com/airline-passengers-revolt-after- three-day-delay-china-723640>.
6 Vernon Nase and Nicholas Humphrey, ‘Angry People in the Sky: Air Rage and the Tokyo
Convention’ (2014) 79 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 701, 710.
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departure and destination as being determinative. As indicated where they fall within
the territory of two States parties to the convention or even within the territory of a
single state “if there is a stopping place in another country” 7 the flight is international
in nature. Article 1(3) of the Montreal Convention provides that “a carriage …
performed by … successive carriers is deemed … to be one undivided carriage if it
has been regarded by the parties as a single operation.” 8 The adoption of this wording
essentially stops carriers from avoiding being classed as engaging in international
carriage by dividing up carriage into discreet legs. As observed in Gerard v American
Airlines9, to determine this issue the courts will turn to the contract of transportation
as evidenced by the passenger ticket and the circumstances surrounding the ticketing.
In Gerard's case Nadeau J pertinently observed that the "courts often rely upon the
contract of transportation in order to determine the parties' objective intent."10 The air
carrier's knowledge that the flight is part of a longer, international voyage is also
pertinent to the Court's conclusion. Here, literally every leg of the author’s Perth –
Guangzhou – Beijing – Guangzhou – Perth journey, all with the same carrier, is
correctly conceptualized objectively as being international in nature.
In Haldimann v Delta Airlines11 the Court observed that "[it](the Convention) enables
international travellers to secure the benefits of the treaty regime even for segments of
international transportation that are wholly within the territory of a signatory […]"12

III COMPENSATION FOR DELAY
The author’s flight was ticketed as one undivided carriage falling under the MC’s
Article 19 in the event of delay. Article 19 (Delay) provides that “[the] carrier is liable
for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or
cargo.” Article 19 also provides that “the carrier shall not be liable for damage
7 Montreal Convention art 1(2).
8 Ibid art 1(3).
9 Gerard v American Airlines, WL 220536 (Conn Super Ct, 2007).
10 Ibid.
11 See Haldimann v Delta Airlines, 168 F3d 1324 (DC Cir, 1999) where Williams J. observed that "the
Pensacola-Gainesville journey was as a matter of law, part of 'international transportation'." Williams J,
delivering the court’s decision, had earlier observed that "[i]t may seem odd that Mrs. Haldimann’s
flights, occurring entirely within the United States and in themselves certainly capable of being viewed
as a complete journey, should prove to be part of “international transportation”. But the Convention
aims primarily to 'achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air
transportation.'"
12 Ibid.
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occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it
or them to take such measures.” In essence this provision imposes on carriers a duty
of due diligence to make reasonable efforts to “avoid the damage” as well as
providing a defence for carriers. While "delay" is not defined in the convention
Goldhirsh suggests that it means "untimely arrival at the place of destination." 13 A
standard clause in tickets or conditions of carriage frequently suggests that the carrier
undertakes to make its best effort to carry the passenger and baggage within a
reasonable time.14
As flagged above, an important distinction is made between avoidable delay (such as
in the case of mechanical issues associated with aircraft), which entails liability and
unavoidable delay (where the all reasonable measures defence is available to the air
carrier).
Where a delay has taken place, arguably the resulting damage may include the cost of
the following:


accommodation and transportation in the event of a missed connecting flight;
and,



additional expenses (eg, an upgrade of the passenger’s ticket) in order to reach
the destination via a different flight.15

The maximum compensation for delay under the Montreal Convention is set at the
level of 4,694 SDR or $AUD8, 413.33.16

13 Lawrence Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated: A Legal Handbook (Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2000) 101.
14 See, for example, Qantas Conditions of Carriage 9.2 (Late of Cancelled Flights) (“reasonable
endeavours”) and Virgin Australia Conditions of Carriage 12.1 (“all reasonable endeavours”); see also
Cathay Pacific Airlines Conditions of Carriage 10.2 (Cancellation, rerouting, Delays, etc.) reference to
taking “all necessary measures to avoid delay” mirroring wording of Article 19 of the Montreal
Convention.
15 Nikolai Ehlers, Elmar Giemulla and Ronald Schmid, Warsaw Convention, Supp. 7, February 1997,
1.
16 Conversion of SDR to Australian dollars is as at 16 August 2017.
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In the author’s case upon late arrival at Guangzhou he was fortunate to find myself
towards the front in an orderly line and served by a supervisor who was fluent in
English. Seeing that Perth bound passengers were being offered a flight leaving the
following day for Melbourne, the author was reluctant to test if the carrier would
provide hotel accommodation despite their obligation to do so under Article 19 of the
Convention. He offered to travel via either Sydney or Brisbane, and to on-travel either
the next day or the day after. As a consequence of the efficiency of the supervisor, his
early place in the queue and his indication of flexibility he found myself on a flight to
Sydney the same evening. In Sydney he was able to stay with friends and the
following day he took a connection back to Perth. Despite the five hour delay in
Beijing the end result was good in the prevailing circumstances. Reasonable options
were offered to the passenger and accepted by the passenger at Guangzhou. The due
diligence obligations of the carrier, even if not initially satisfied in Beijing, were
ultimately fulfilled in Guangzhou.
Nevertheless, significant delays, as above, do emphasize the uncertain nature of the
airline’s obligations under the very generally worded Article 19. Additionally, most
passengers are unaware of their rights and hence potentially vulnerable to airlines
intent on avoiding their obligations.

IV AUSTRALIAN POSITION ON COMPENSATION FOR DELAY
In respect of domestic carriage by air within Australia, a recent Choice magazine
study reveals that certain low cost domestic carriers refuse to provide meals or
accommodation and transfers even where the delay is within the airline’s control, such
as with mechanical issues.17 All too frequently carriers ‘Conditions of Carriage’
contain vague and conditional references to delay in a situation where the relevant law
fails to address the issue of passenger’s rights in the event of a delay.18

17 See Jemma Castle, “Flight times not guaranteed,” Choice Magazine, 11 April, 2017.
18 See, for example the use of the word “may” in 12.6 (Compensation) and 14.5 (Refusal of Carriage
due to Overbooking) in Virgin Airline’s Conditions of Carriage. Courts struggle with the use of the
conditional tense, let alone the ordinary man in the street (the man on the Clapham Omnibus)
attempting to construe the meaning of the conditions of carriage if provided with a copy.
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The pertinent law here is the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959
(Commonwealth).19 Section 28 of Part IV of the Act (and its State equivalents)
provides for the basic liability of the carrier in the event of death or injury in an
‘accident’ and mirrors Article 17 of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions. In the
case of purely domestic carriage it is noteworthy that an equivalent text to Article 19
of the Montreal Convention (Delay) is not to be found in the provisions or wording of
Part IV of the Act. In the absence of express legislative reference to the alleviating
measures to be taken by domestic carriers, they are arguably in a position to deny
compensation or accommodation to passengers subject to delay. 20 Further, anecdotal
evidence suggests the responsible Commonwealth Department21 may not favour
reform of the relevant laws. Castle cites a Departmental spokesperson in 2015 as
stating the domestic air carriers are able to “offer cheap fares on the basis that the
consumer elects to assume risks associated with cancellation or delay."22
In a comparative sense a number of other jurisdictions have gone much farther than
Australia in specifying and guaranteeing a basic level of compensation.

V COMPARISON TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS
For instance, in the European Union, under EC Regulation No. 261/2004 (Air
Passenger Rights Regulation) from 2005 passengers are entitled to refreshments,
telephone calls and hotel accommodation (if overnight wait is involved under Article
9 of the EU Regulation)23 as well as compensation up to E600 depending on the
length of the delay.24 Across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand the applicable liability
19 The Commonwealth Act applies in the home jurisdiction of the author courtesy of the Civil Aviation
(Carriers’ Liability) Act 1961 (WA) sections 3 (referring to the applied provisions of the
Commonwealth Act and Regulations) and 6 (Application of certain provisions of the Commonwealth
Act).
20 Castle, op. cit. referencing a recent Choice Magazine study revealing that Jetstar and Tiger Airlines
refuse to provide meals or accommodation and transfers even where the delay is within the airline’s
control, such as with mechanical issues.
21 The responsible Department in this context is the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure and
Regional Development.
22 Castle op cit.
23 Castle, op.cit.
24 Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004 Article 7 (Right to compensation); see also Aviation Briefs (the
Journal of the Aviation Law Association of Australia and New Zealand) – June/July 2007; see also
Articles 4 (Denied boarding), 5 (Cancellation), 6 (Delay), 7 (Right to compensation), 8 (Right to
reimbursement or re-routing) and 9 (Right to care) of EU Regulation 261/2004; see also Robert
Lawson and Tim Marland, ‘The Montreal Convention 1999 and the Decisions of the ECJ in the cases
of IATA and Sturgeon – in Harmony or Discord?’ (2011) 36 Air & Space Law 99.
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regime prescribes for compensation as great as 10 times the cost of the ticket in the
event of avoidable delay.25 Additionally, section 91ZC(2) permits carriers, by way of
special contract, to “increase the amount of the carrier’s liability under that
subsection.”26 This permits carriers to engage in industry endorsed voluntary schemes
to reimburse passengers such as Bill of Rights programs voluntarily setting
reimbursement levels.27

VI OVERBOOKING AND DENIED BOARDING (AKA BUMPING)
The allied practice of airlines overbooking domestic flights in particular is subject to
virtually no regulation in the Australian context. Not even the Australian Consumer
Law seeks to provide for liability on the part of the Airline ‘bumping’ passengers from
a flight. In contrast, in the United States the Department of Transport has prescribed
for compensation where boarding is denied to a passenger (involuntary denied
boarding) at a level of 4 times the cost of one-way fare up to a maximum of $1,300.28

VII CONCLUSION
Arguably, the general wording of Article 19 of the Montreal Convention creates a
need for States to develop a standard regulatory response to delay in international
carriage. Both the EC Regulation and the New Zealand legislation may serve as a
model for Australia to develop clear legal principles and levels of compensation in
appropriate circumstances. Domestically the practice of bumping passengers and, in
particular, the unsympathetic response of budget carriers towards delay strongly
supports the need for legislative intervention to provide a basic level of consumer
protection. With overbooking practices there is, at very least, the need for legislative
examination of the practices of air carriers with a view to establishing a uniform
approach to be observed by all carriers. In the case of ‘bumping’ there is something
inherently unsound about permitting air carriers to sell tickets for seats on aircraft that
will not be available unless a certain percentage of passengers fail to present for the
25 Civil Aviation Act 1990 (NZ) section 91ZC(1) prescribes that the “liability of the carrier in respect
of damage caused by delay is limited to the lesser of (a) the amount of damage proved to have been
sustained as a result of the delay; or (b) an amount representing 10 times the sum paid for the carriage.”
26 Ibid s 91ZC(2).
27 Aviation Briefs, op. cit. noting that “[certain] airlines in the US have created their own ‘bill of
rights,’ such as JetBlue Airways.”
28 Alexander Anolik, ‘The Obligations of Airlines and the Rights of Passengers’ (2013) 30(3) GP Solo
10.
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carriage. The mere tolerance of the regulators for the practice does not justify this
practice. Once upon a time the carriers were able to place passengers on stand-by in
the event of seats becoming available through late cancellation of a failure to appear.
This orderly approach to a great extent appears to have given way to the systematic
over-selling of tickets.
In short, the paucity of domestic regulation and guidance in the cases of both delay
and denied boarding needs to be addressed by government. Equally, as has on
occasion been suggested, and is permitted, for example, under the New Zealand
legislation, air carriers may themselves create a scheme that provides a uniform
response across all carriers, an industry-wide scheme. In any event, we ought not to
preserve a system that leaves many travellers confused and unaware of their often “illdefined” rights.
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